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ABSTRACT
This article considers TVNZ’s audience discussion programme, State of
the Nation, as a moment of public sphere discourse. The programme’s
pre-broadcast branding and deliberate construction of a bicultural televi-
sion space is examined, while particular attention is given to the hosts’
framing of the discussion and the programme’s treatment of identity. The
article concludes that the programme was a questionable public sphere
contribution, partly because the structuring of the discussion reinforced
the established polarities of the Aotearoa/New Zealand ‘race relations’
debate, over-privileged producer control at the expense of audience par-
ticipation and was, more generally, indicative of the limits of TVNZ’s
post-Charter commitment to public service broadcasting.
ONE AREA of media analysis that has fruitfully applied ‘public sphere’theoretical perspectives is the loosely defined genre of the television‘audience’ or ‘current affairs’ discussion show (Livingstone, 1996).
Örnebring (2003) suggests ‘current affairs debate programmes … very con-
sciously and clearly present themselves as important, timely and necessary’
(p. 503) and can therefore be regarded as broadcaster attempts to concretise
their commitment to a public sphere ethos.  Broadcast on TV One on Thurs-
day, 10 June 2004, Television New Zealand’s (TVNZ’s) State of the Nation
 134  PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 11 (1) 2005
THE INDIGENOUS PUBLIC SPHERE
was clearly imagined as such a programme and marketed as a deliberate in-
tervention, by the state broadcaster, in the  (so-called) Aotearoa/New Zealand
‘race relations’  debate. The critical evaluation of that programme, as a mo-
ment of public sphere discourse, is the focus of this article.
Produced by Screentime Productions, State of the Nation was broadcast
in an extended prime-time slot from 8.35 to 10.35 pm. The programme was
co-presented by Anita McNaught, Kerre Woodham and Robbie Rakete (all of
whom have established profiles as broadcasters in New Zealand) and, through
a mix of participatory audience discussion and pre-recorded video clips, pur-
posefully set out to discuss various New Zealand race relations issues.  The
context which the programme promised to address was immediately
backgrounded by a series of inter-related issues – including controversies
over the government’s legislative plans to formalise ‘Crown’ (i.e. state) own-
ership of the foreshore and seabed, the embryonic moves towards the forma-
tion of a new Maori party (Stokes, 2004) and National Party leader Don Brash’s
2004 Orewa speech, which was celebrated by some as a cathartic expression
of Pakeha grievances with Maori cultural privilege. 1 The State of the Nation
‘text’ is positioned here as one illustration of this wider socio-political dis-
cussion of race relations in 2004 Aotearoa/New Zealand.
The audience discussion programme as discursive space
 One of the key theoretical questions facing audience discussion programmes,
as public sphere events, has been formulated by Livingstone (1996):
[Can] audience discussion programmes …contribute to a contempo-
rary public sphere in which the viewer-as-citizen participates in proc-
esses of symbolic construction, public opinion formation, and political
discourse… or [are they] merely a travesty of ‘real’ [and substantive]
political debate? (p. 262)
Although she describes the television studio as ‘in many ways a highly unsat-
isfactory space for public discussion’, Livingstone suggests audience discus-
sion shows can make a valuable contribution to the construction of the public
sphere by offering a space for ‘emotional’  – as distinct to dry, rational –
engagement on important socio-political issues (ibid., p. 277); indeed,
Livingstone and Lunt (1994) draw equivalences between the discussion show
format and formal therapy, as both processes seek to construct a discursive
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space where ‘marginalised voices, repressed experiences and taboo thoughts
are given a legitimate place’ (p. 65). This esteeming of the genre as a cathartic
‘celebration of ordinary experience’ has been questioned by Carpentier (2001),
however, who shows how audience ‘participation’ is ultimately subject to the
controlling and disciplining hand of the production team. Nevertheless,
Carpentier does credit the audience discussion show format for placing (so
called) ‘ordinary people’ in a ‘relative egalitarian position towards members
of different elites’ (p. 228), though he tempers this by criticising media insti-
tutional actors for their failure ‘to question the power relations which encir-
cle the media system itself’ (ibid., p. 230).
This analysis will consider a tension in Habermas’s own formulation be-
tween the desirability of widening the level of democratic representation in
the public sphere and its qualitative impact on deliberative dialogue (Calhoun,
1992) – a pertinent issue in light of State of the Nation’s decision to invite
over 100 people into the studio. Örnebring (20031) has, for instance, ob-
served that while the global ascent of a deregulated, profit-driven model of
broadcasting since the 1980s increased the quantity of participation in audi-
ence discussion shows, the effect sometimes merely serves to create the illu-
sion of a functioning public sphere, as participants are given less time to
explicate their views in highly structured formats. Political communication
is, in effect, reduced to the ‘politics of consumerism’ (Garnham, 1995, p.
247). Fairclough (2000) positions the question of participant access as cen-
tral to any normative conceptualisation of public sphere discourse, though he
concedes (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) that this laudable principle still
needs to negotiate a way around the issue of successfully ‘mediating’
(Garnham, 1995) such an open-ended and potentially chaotic dialogue, as
well as address the problematic issue of what a ‘representative’ and ‘demo-
cratic’ television debate might look like (Livingstone, 1996, p. 263).
Methodological framework
A concern with discourse (i.e. the intersubjective production of meaning
through language and semiosis) and the structuring of the public sphere as a
discursive space is central to this article. We draw on critical discourse analy-
sis methodologies, which understand discourse analysis as both a methodo-
logical and theoretical framework for examining the relationship between the
textual and the social (Chouliaraarki and Fairclough, 1999), and the textual
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analysis presented in this article follows Fairclough’s interest in how ‘any
text… will be simultaneously representing [italics added], setting up identi-
ties, and setting up relations’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 5). As a text, State of the
Nation is formally understood here as a composite of different textual genres,
as the various marketing materials used by TVNZ to promote the programme,
such as press releases, newspaper and television adverts, can be understood
as attempts to pre-frame the audience show discussion, as well as signify the
national broadcaster’s commitment to a public service ethos.  In this respect,
we regard Fairclough’s idea of ‘genre chains’, which he describes as different
genres ‘regularly linked together’ (2003, p. 216), as a useful way of anchor-
ing our analysis of how the State of the Nation text constructs the race rela-
tions debate from the pre-broadcast branding to the actual discussion.
This article has a particular interest in the question of identity, and how
aspects of identity are ‘articulated’ and ‘worked’ together (Fairclough, 2003,
p. 218) with particular discourses (representations) and genres (relations).
We suggest that a sustained focus on the central race relations question of
identity is a particularly useful way of grounding our interest in the public
sphere and bi-cultural dynamics of the State of the Nation text. It is also help-
ful way of exploring some of the dialectical tensions between the producer-
host wish to orchestrate and frame the discussion around their own symbolic
construction of the race relations discussion and more empowered, organic
forms of audience participation. This interest in the construction of identity is
supplemented by a more detailed discourse analysis of pronouns, which Van
Dijk (1998) identifies as ‘the best known grammatical category of the expres-
sion and manipulation of social relations, status and power, and hence of
underlying ideologies’ (p. 203). Pronouns, particularly the use of the pro-
nominal pair ‘us’ and ‘them’, are key linguistic markers of identity, and this
analysis offers some micro-level illustrations of the identities constructed by,
and in, State of the Nation – including examples which either implicitly af-
firm or problematise the structuring of the discussion as, to put it crudely, a
Pakeha versus Maori discussion.
It is, however, not possible to discuss all the ideologically significant
discursive features of the programme. Instead, we see this analysis as an over-
view, supported by specific illustrations, of how the programme was con-
structed as a discursive and public sphere event. The article concludes by
situating our analysis in a wider theoretical consideration of the public sphere,
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while we also modestly suggest ways of perhaps improving this type of audi-
ence discussion show format in the future.
Pre-broadcast branding
 From an institutional perspective, State of the Nation can be positioned as a
concretisation of TVNZ’s adoption of a Public Service Charter in 2003.  This
controversial move, driven by the Labour-led government, took three years
to implement and was promoted as a commitment to re-articulating a public
service ethos at the national broadcaster level after the neo-liberal transfor-
mation of the broadcasting environment in the 1980s. The Charter seeks to
differentiate TVNZ from its private competitors and address public concern
over advertising levels, falling standards, and excessive spending. Neverthe-
less, the requirement that TVNZ continues to return a profit and deliver pub-
lic service style programming means the broadcaster walks a fine line be-
tween meeting charter objectives and retaining market share (Comrie &
Fountaine, 2004).  Although not produced by TVNZ’s news and current af-
fairs division, State of the Nation was the network’s most significant primetime
discussion about contemporary race relations in 2004.  TVNZ’s attempt to
engage with an often polarised debate in a two-hour prime time special was
commendable and consistent with a Charter-based commitment to the princi-
ples of public service (to inform, entertain and educate), the building of com-
munity and citizenship capacity, as well as ensuring ‘the presence of a sig-
nificant Mäori voice’. However, the broadcast still had to be structured to
accommodate eight separate commercial breaks.
Pre-broadcast marketing of the programme was cast in a Charter-con-
scious paternalistic register and, as Livingstone’s (1996, p.262) description
of the genre would suggest, promisess an ‘unashamedly middle of the road’
forum where ‘ordinary people’ can ‘talk rationally’, ‘offer different perspec-
tives’ and contribute to ‘better understanding’. (TVNZ, 2004)   The perspec-
tive of ordinary people is pre-positioned in an antithetical relation with an
implied elite, for as the advertising copy starkly puts it: ‘No politicians. No
extremists. It’s a chance for ordinary Kiwis to have their say’. The press re-
lease also implores ‘New Zealanders’ to ‘put aside political correctness and
discuss the things that bug them about race relations in this country’: a for-
mulation that signals a conscious therapeutic and cathartic intent on the part
of the programme’s producers. Hence, the branding of the programme con-
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structs a thematic and stylistic representation of ordinary identity that is frus-
trated by the self-censoring ‘politically correct’ race relations debate and tired
of hearing the same old ‘political’, ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ voices.2
These populist  appeals, redoubled in newspaper adverts, are also inter-
esting from the perspective of the production team’s own stance towards a
bicultural politics, and suggest a wish to move beyond ethnic markers of iden-
tity. Yet the paradoxes of this attempt to transcend ‘race’, while positioning it
as master signifier, is already suggested by the multiple press release refer-
ences to ‘the two races’ as well as the clear marketing of co-hosts Kerre
Woodham and Robert Rakete as designated ethnic ‘cheerleaders’.
Given the fraught nature of the issues, some were surprised that the pro-
gramme was hosted by the BBC’s Anita McNaught, a former TV1 news-
reader, but dubbed in the press as a cultural ‘outsider’ or ‘import’ (Drinnan,
2004).3 New Zealand First leader Winston Peters (2004) suggested TVNZ
had ‘forgotten that New Zealand is no longer a British colony and that we do
have a number of television front people who could do an excellent job’. Not
surprisingly, Peters’ demand that TVNZ reveal the details of its contract with
McNaught (Cook, 2004) was ignored by the broadcaster, though the contro-
versy about her involvement may have contributed to the deferential and largely
non-interrogative posture she assumed during much of the broadcast. This
deference can be more broadly understood in terms of the wider socio-cul-
tural sensitivity of publicly discussing race relations in a country which, ac-
cording to a historically dominant Pakeha narrative, has ‘the best race rela-
tions in the world’ (King, 2003, p. 471).
Constructing a bi-cultural television space
The voice-over welcoming viewers to the programme identifies the studio’s
location as Puke Ariki4 on the New Plymouth waterfront, and the historical
significance of the site to the ‘shared history’ of Pakeha and Maori is empha-
sised in McNaught’s introduction. The voice-over preamble describes the
programme as a coming together of Pakeha and Maori for a ‘heart to heart on
race relations’, a formulation which underscores the billing of the programme
as a therapeutic offloading of suppressed race relations sentiment.  The na-
tional race relations story is structured around four background segments in-
corporated into the programme’s general structure, whose tightly scripted
narrative forms offer a stark contrast to the structurally disjointed contribu-
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tions of ordinary participants.
The continuity between contemporary and historical events is suggested
by the combined use of illustrations, images of documents, old photographs
and contemporary location shots of Woodham and Rakete, who articulate
what are positioned as the distinct historical perspectives of Pakeha and Maori.
The dialogical structuring of these pieces, punctuated by light-hearted banter
and teasing between the presenters, work to a colloquially reformulated ab-
stract historical narrative (such as Woodham’s idiomatic reference to the ‘hos-
pital pass’ job of translating the Treaty).  Their tone is also occasionally evalu-
ative as, for instance, when Rakete refers to the Crown troops’ attack on the
peaceful Maori residents of Parihaka as ‘one of the worst civil rights viola-
tions in the history of this country’. But this assertion is immediately coun-
tered by Woodham’s claim  that ‘it was not, however, a holocaust’: a clear
allusion to a much cited comment previously attributed to Tariana Turia, Maori
Party founder and ex-Labour government minister, and implicitly positioned
here as a Pakeha rebuttal of what the pre-broadcast publicity represents as
‘extremist’ Maori rhetoric.
The evocation of a sense of bicultural difference and division is starkly
conveyed by the arrangement of the studio audience, who are organised into
two distinct Pakeha and Maori sections, with 50 members in each group. A
panel of 13 ‘experts’ is separately positioned in the middle of the studio. The
discussion follows a pre-fabricated format and structure, where various as-
pects of the ‘race relations’ debate are addressed in segments that comple-
ment the programme’s eight commercial breaks. The basic thematic and
chronological outline is as follows:  (1) Introduction/Taranaki as a particular
illustration of the national debate; (2) Treaty of Waitangi;5 (3) ‘two classes of
citizenship’ under the Treaty; (4) historical grievances; (5) Taranaki as a par-
ticular illustration of historical grievances; (6) foreshore and seabed; (7) Gov-
ernment’s intervention in the foreshore and seabed; (8) the future; (9) televi-
sion audience poll.
The programme’s four background segments take up a total of just over
14 minutes of broadcasting time, while the eight commercial breaks take up
approximately 25 minutes. These in-built time constraints on the discussion
are indicative of the general tension between commercial imperatives and the
chance for open, deliberative dialogue. Visual flash cards, offering various
bits of un-referenced statistical information, also appear on screen both be-
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fore and after each of the eight commercial breaks. Many of these flash cards
serve to either explicitly or implicitly juxtapose the comparative position of
Pakeha and Mäori, as, for instance:
Scholarships available to all tertiary students – 1451
Scholarships available only to Maori students – 154
Interestingly, of the 100 designated ‘ordinary’ people present in the studio, 43
make an on-screen contribution to the discussion during the broadcast, and
the programme was largely successful in ensuring a reasonable parity of con-
tributions from both designated identities, with 23 Pakeha and 20 Maori con-
tributors. However, the fact that over half of the ordinary people make no
vocal contribution to the discussion clearly illustrates the logistical problems
of attempting to achieve a genuine participatory dialogue on television; in-
deed, two of the designated 13 experts also make no contribution to the dis-
cussion, something that McNaught apologises for near the end of the pro-
gramme.
Discourse structuring and framing
The show’s raison d’être is outlined in McNaught’s introduction: ‘Tonight
we are talking about the relationship BETWEEN6 Maori and Pakeha’. Assum-
ing a caring and empathetic discourse ‘style’ (Fairclough, 2003, p.26) , con-
sonant with the genre’s therapeutic posture, she describes the programme as
‘a discussion that is LONG overdue’. Invoking an unspecified ‘we’, perhaps
best understood as the assumed register of a paternalistic and self-consciously
educational national broadcaster, McNaught asserts ‘we understand that it’s
not always an easy discussion to have either, but we’d like to see discussions
like this happening nationwide’.
Although the Pakeha/Maori/expert structuring of the studio space is de-
scribed by McNaught and visually illustrated, she immediately seeks to de-
emphasise the binary regulation of the studio audience space by stating that
she, like the discerning viewer, understands that the structuring of the discus-
sion around binary markers of identity is much too ‘simplistic’:
We understand that many here would be comfortable sitting on either
side [adding, with a wry smile to camera] but television is at times a
necessarily simplistic medium and seating, I’m afraid, reflects that.
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The agency of two distinct audiences is affirmed by McNaught: ‘YOU the
[in-studio] audience are driving this discussion and YOU the audience at home
also have a crucial role’. Reinforcing this discourse of the empowered
audience(s), she also positions the ‘expert panel’ as ‘not here to tell you what
to think’. However, at the same time, McNaught suggests a condescending
distinction between well reasoned ‘expert’ contributions (positioned as the
arbiters of fact: a categorisation reinforced by their visual positioning in the
studio space) and emotionally charged ‘ordinary’ contributions. The  experts
– the word choice alone is a powerful demarcation of identity –  are instead
‘here to bring clarity and to correct points of fact’. Not surprisingly, the posi-
tioning of the expert panel in an unsullied fact-clarifying role proves contro-
versial – most obviously when  law lecturer David Round’s description of the
Treaty as ‘practically meaningless’ is reproached as ‘assertion rather than
fact’ by McNaught. The arbitrary nature of the studio distinction between
expert and ordinary person is also suggested by Rakete’s identification of one
Maori audience member as ‘the chief negotiator’ for Ngati Mutunga7,  while
another ‘ordinary’ contributor self-references his work as a ‘public policy
analyst’ on the seabed and foreshore.
McNaught introduces her co-hosts, Kerre Woodham and Robbie Rakete,
who are invited to offer perfunctory ‘Pakeha’ and ‘Maori’ perspectives on the
race relations debate. These are in turn supplemented by two consciously
designated ‘Pakeha’ and ‘Maori’ audience contributions, which establish the
programme’s general – and ironically quite politically correct –  pattern of
consciously balancing and reciprocating contributions from both sides. The
two supplementary Pakeha contributions, the second of which assumes a dis-
tinctly liberal posture interrogative of the ‘Pakeha side of the story’, serve to
illustrate what Woodham calls ‘a real divergence of opinion’ among Pakeha,
though her initial reformulationation of a generic Pakeha perspective, which
appropriates fragments of discourses hostile to the Treaty and the settlement
process, is exasperated,  fearful and metaphorically lurid:
Well, ever since Don Brash’s Orewa speech, they’ve had an awful lot to
say and it’s almost like a scab has been ripped off, and it appears our
race relations isn’t quite as idyllic as we once thought. There seems to
be a real concern that the Treaty claims are going ON and ON and there
is no such thing as a full and final settlement and the Treaty of Waitangi
could lead us down a separatist path and that seems to be what’s con-
cerning Pakeha.
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Many of McNaught’s questions and interjections throughout the broadcast,
particularly her cues at the start of each themed section, reinforce, despite the
asserted disclaimers, the programme’s polarised representation of the race
relations question: ‘The Treaty of Waitangi, the founding document of our
nation? Or a modern-day irrelevance that’s fuelling damaging divisions be-
tween Pakeha and Maori?’; ‘The grievance process or the grievance indus-
try’; ‘Is this current race wrangle constructive or destructive?’
These framing strategies sit uneasily with the programme’s declared com-
mitment to be ‘un-ashamedly middle of the road’, as the binary structuring of
much of the discussion reproduces a kind of extremism that the pre-broadcast
marketing disavows. At the same time, the polarised, and sometimes
deliberatively pejorative, representation of race issues can also be read as the
production team’s conscious attempt to cultivate the non ‘politically correct’
space promised in the advance billing.  This is suggested, for instance, by
McNaught’s categorical (‘we know’) reformulation of one aggrieved Pakeha
contribution – using the same evaluative, anthropomorphised metaphors as a
question to the expert panel: ‘…the  Treaty has, of course, crept into legisla-
tion; we know that.  It’s become entrenched in aspects of New Zealand life’;
and, more generally, by McNaught’s appropriation of hackneyed morally evalu-
ative categorisations like the ‘grievance industry’ .
Nevertheless, the assertion of one Pakeha male that ‘I don’t know of any
white people in the world who have eaten each other’ (a characterisation  that
situates Maori within an archaic colonialist discourse, representing indig-
enous peoples as uncivilised primitives and inferior) is forcefully censored
by McNaught, who, indicating the limits of the programme’s disavowal of
political correctness, reproaches it as ‘out of line’ and ‘very hostile’: ‘that’s
not the kind of debate we want tonight’.
Partly because of the general time constraints, and the pre-fabricated for-
mat, the space for supplementary questions is severely curtailed and dialogical
exchanges, perfunctory, tend to be restricted to host-expert interactions. Much
of the time McNaught is reduced to giving bland assertions of her gratitude
for the simple fact of an audience contribution (‘thank you so much’ is her
frequent response). The limited opportunity for reflexive discourse about the
role of media in the construction of the race relations debate is illustrated,
too, when the only explicit observation on the media’s tendency ‘to polarise
the issues’ meets with a ‘thank you so much’ response by McNaught, who,
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pressed for time, proceeds to remind the television audience of the home
viewer poll. Her signalling of the need to manage two distinct audiences, the
studio audience and the audience ‘at home’, underscores another tension in
the programme’s framing and structure. The home audience are urged to con-
tribute to the discussion by multiple verbalised and on-screen appeals to tel-
ephone or email the show. Yet, this technology-dependent attempt to give
‘voice’ to the television audience is ultimately a technical fiasco, for when
the much heralded results of the Treaty-related viewer poll  appear on screen
near the end of the programme, the statistical data, as McNaught is forced to
concede, appears self-contradictory and incoherent.  Thus a reductionist, sim-
plistic attempt to give agency to the audience at home fails in its own limited
terms.
The binary structuring of the programme as a Mäori/Pakeha discussion is
consciously subverted by the production team near the end of the show. Call-
ing attention to the hybridity of the Aotearoa/New Zealand identity, co-hosts
Woodham and Rakete swap sides of the auditorium to mediate the contribu-
tion of the ‘other’ side. Rakete observes ‘I’m a Maori… but I’m also a Pakeha’
and in a more distinctly ‘Kiwi’ register asserts: ‘I feel equally as comfortable
standing here with my mates in the corner’. Woodham, in an analagous shift
to a Maori register, suggests that ‘there are many many many Pakeha who
feel that Maori are their tangata whenua’,8 and then casually reformulates the
debate as ‘not an ethnic debate’ but ‘an ideological one’.  Responding to a
direct prompt from McNaught, expert panelist, sociologist Paul Spoonley,
also raises the slipperiness of ‘New Zealand’ identity, criticising  and criti-
cises the bi-cultural tendency to ‘forget that there are other people’. For
Spoonley, the issue confusion is not whether everyone involved is a New
Zealander but ‘what you might be in addition to that’. Instead of  a race-or
ethnicity-based model of identity, he suggests a model that allows people to
identify ‘how they feel’ about identity and, hence, have it self-construed rather
than prescribed (Singelis, 1994). This contribution  meets with a ‘hear, hear’
affirmation from at least one member of the audience.
However, these attempts to problematise the bicultural framing of the
discussion are often formal rather than substantive. Overall, the discussion
remains locked in binary assumptions – partly because, it must be said, of the
audience contributions themselves. This can be illustrated more clearly by
considering how pronouns were used by both presenters and participants.
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Pronoun use: Identity and allegiances
The ideologically resonant, pronominal pair us and them, either  explicitly or
implicitly, constructs social relationships by signalling both (positive) in-group
membership and (negative) out-group membership. Such a pairing can gener-
ate an  overly simplistic view of the complex and multiple cultural identities
that may be present within social groups.
Analysis of the State of the Nation studio audience shows that pronouns
signifying allegiance to a particular group (the pronouns we, they and their
related pronominal forms us, our, ourselves, them and their) are predominant.
This is predictable, for many of the hosts’  questions and interjections are
constructed to elicit personal opinions and reactions by inviting audience
members to respond as (reductive) representatives of their designated social
group as, for example, when McNaught turns to ask the Maori  side of the
studio,  ‘What do Maori  want to do with the foreshore and seabed if they got
it?’ What would they do? Charge for access to the beach?’  This question
effectively demonstrates the programme’s polarising approach, presenting
complex and potentially volatile issues in a reductive, more palatable and
overly simplified fashion.  It further illustrates, too, McNaught’s conscious
efforts to give voice to some of the more extreme claims made by a similarly
reductive Pakeha Other, as exemplified here by her reformulation of a par-
ticular customary right claim9 into a discourse asserting that ‘they’ want to
own the beaches.  Woodham’s articulation of a reductive Pakeha perspective,
in the pre-recorded background piece on the seabed and foreshore issue, is
even more extremist in its reformulation of Pakeha concerns about Maori
intentions:  ‘there’s a real perception amongst Pakeha that Maori want to
claim everything, the radio waves, the seabed and foreshore; they’ll be after
the air that we breathe next’.
Yet the ways in which participants refer to themselves and others under-
mine the simplistic binary structures suggested by the physical layout of the
studio and the hosts’ representation of many issues. Participants’ pronoun use
reveals continually shifting points of view and indicates the multiplicity of
identities invoked during the discussion. The use of the pronoun we, for in-
stance, best demonstrates the slippery ground that the participants are negoti-
ating.  Throughout the programme, we is variously used to denote, inter alia,
Maori, Pakeha, the nation, the nation as economic entity, the broadcasters
and the entire studio.    Some speakers use the pronoun to suggest contempo-
raneous affiliation to multiple social groups, as demonstrated in the follow-
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ing contribution by one Maori audience member:
I think as New Zealanders we need to celebrate the diversity of who we
are as a people. Maori, we acknowledge every race that is here in
Aotearoa, we celebrate them, their language and their culture. … But
we need to realise we are separate in terms of our culture, colour and
language. Can’t we celebrate that as a people and recognise that? When
we go overseas we all say we are Kiwis, everyone knows that. We are
proud to be Kiwis.
Here, the pronoun we, initially collocated with a celebratory multi-cultural
discourse, first implies all New Zealanders, shifts in meaning  to denote a
distinct Maori  perspective and ends by perhaps suggesting a unified New
Zealander (i.e. ‘Kiwi’ ) perspective.  The changing meaning of the pronoun
results in an ambiguous referent for the pronoun at the end of this statement,
leading one to question whether it does indeed refer to all New Zealanders.
While the use of we seems all-embracing here, it can also convey, as Fairclough
(2000) suggests, ‘a vagueness which obfuscates difference.  Inclusive ‘we’ as
a device for avoiding division leads in some cases to incoherence’ (p. 176).
Occasionally, however, the pronoun ‘we’ is used by participants to em-
phasise difference by actively distinguishing the experience of their own group
from a clearly indentifiable Other, demonstrating Van Dijk’s (1998) conten-
tion that ‘there are few words in the language that may be as socially and
ideologically “loaded” as a simple we’ (p. 203). These uses serve to enact the
racial divisions the programme seeks to both reveal and mollify. For exam-
ple, in response to McNaught’s provocative questions, ‘What constitutes a
Maori? How Maori do you have to be to be Maori?’, one Maori participant
retorts, ‘What does it constitute to be Pakeha? Don’t ask us what it consti-
tutes to be Maori, we know what that means. What does it constitute to be
Pakeha?’ These quite politically incorrect questions, asked ‘because a lot of
people wanted to know’ asserts McNaught, construct a Pakeha subject inter-
rogative and suspicious of the authenticity of the Maori  Other. But the defen-
sive response also attests to the asymmetrical nature of the question from a
wider cultural perspective, for, unlike white New Zealanders, Maori were
historically defined by law according to their biological makeup (the Births
and Deaths Registration Act 1951, repealed only in 1995, defined the Maori
population as those with half or more Maori blood.)
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The effort to define a collective, bicultural we sometimes results in a
marginalising of those cultures not included in the historical Treaty partner-
ship, who are, in effect, not identified as part of New Zealand’s bicultural
framework. For instance, one audience member self-identified ‘as a Pacific
Islander’ and seated on the Pakeha side of the studio, describes, during an
explicit discussion of the Treaty, her frustration at feeling excluded and alien-
ated from this national debate:
The Treaty is a partnership between the Crown and Maori . The Crown
is the Queen of England and myself I am a Pacific Islander/ New Zea-
lander. I am not a Maori nor am I the Crown or the Queen, so therefore,
the Treaty actually has no part for me as a New Zealander.
This woman’s sense of out-group exclusion is strongly affirmed in the imme-
diate follow up to her contribution, when, in response to Rakete’s implicit
reformulation of her concerns as a question about the place of other ‘ethnic
minorities’ in New Zealand’, one Maori audience member responds:
In my mind, I believe  that their relationship to the Treaty  –  they come
under  the British subjects. They are immigrants to New Zealand.  And
you have the Mäori  and Pakeha, and any immigrant that comes into the
country falls  under the category of the British subject. They do not sit
on the side of  Maori.
The stark demarcation of identity articulated here alienates not only a
multicultural perspective, but also a Pakeha perspective by offering  a robust
reminder of their colonial identity as British subjects. It also attests to the
floating contemporary usage of the Maori word ‘Pakeha’ (a term not found in
either translation of the Treaty) which is implicitly used here to categorise
any non- Maori, including Europeans, Asians and Samoans. However, for
many audience members, the word Pakeha seems to refer more coherently to
native-born or long-term residents of British ancestry, sometimes including
continental European immigrants, thus implicitly excluding New Zealanders
of Chinese, Indian and Pacific Island descent (Bayard 1995). For instance,
one Pakeha audience member characterises Pakeha as ‘white people’, while
the Maori treaty claims lawyer Te Kani Williams  equates Pakeha with for-
eign Western concepts of land ownership: ‘Ownership is a Pakeha system
which has been brought in.’
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They (and its related pronominal forms them and  their) is used to signify
different groups throughout the programme and refers, inter alia, to the stu-
dio audience, Pakeha or Maori, New Zealanders, the nation, the Crown and
the Department of Conservation. The use of the word they not only reveals a
distinctive Other, it can also stridently demarcate the limits of one’s own
group identity as constructed through a clear us and them dichotomy. This
perspective, the one from which the binary framing of much of the discussion
takes its cue, is clearly seen when one Pakeha audience member expresses
resentment about what she regards as a privileging of a Maori rights dis-
course. Positioning her ‘New Zealand’ identity in opposition to the Maori
Other, and seeking to solidify that identity with an appeal to her own sense of
history, she asserts:
They are talking about their rights and they are talking about their
whakapapa10. What about us New Zealanders who were born and bred
here for generations after generations after generations?  … There are
plenty of people that are disadvantaged in this country equally as much
as Maori.
On the other hand, a number of Pakeha, while maintaining their distinctive
cultural position, express sympathy for the Maori political situation. For in-
stance, one expresses his admiration for the ‘gracious’ way Maori have con-
ducted themselves in the face of difficult and frustrating legal disputes and
another participant, Andrew, appropriates a discourse of Kiwi fair-mindedness
to suggest the foreshore and seabed should be returned to Maori.  Modestly
presenting his viewpoint as ‘representative perhaps of some part of New Zea-
land’, yet consciously seeking alliance with an unspecified, earlier contribu-
tion from the Maori side of the studio, Andrew explains his position:
I’m a Kiwi, we’re fair people. Give it back. As the man said, what do
you fear with Maori ownership? I don’t. I would fear American owner-
ship more. At least I have a connection with the Maori people.
Even though Andrew distinguishes himself from Maori, his contribution in-
dicates that he believes that the threat represented by cultural difference is a
matter of degree. He frames the local New Zealand power struggles within a
wider power relations discourse, seeking to unite Maori with the rest of New
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Zealand in the face of the external threat of American economic hegemony.
This discursive move projects an alternative us and them construction, which
has parallels in how the Crown is imagined as the ideologically distinctive
Other.
 It is in relation to the Crown that the inadequacy of the Pakeha and Maori
dichotomy seems clearest, especially  in the two groups’ shared attitude to-
wards the role of the government in handling Treaty claims and assets. With-
out fail, references to Crown and government agencies, such as the Waitangi
Tribunal11 and Department of  Conservation, are negative, evoking unfair-
ness,  unequal application of law or the mismanagement of lands and assets.
Appropriating a discourse of national ownership and a critical disposi-
tion towards the neo-liberalisation of the New Zealand economy, one Pakeha
audience member observes: ‘They [the government] have got a very good
history of selling our treasures.… My concern is how good a caretaker will
they be?’ The ‘rightness’ [sic] of this contribution is then affirmed by a Maori
audience member, who,  seeking to subvert a stereotypical discourse which
casts Maori as a dysfunctional social group (i.e. spongers –  see Walker, 2002),
also frames the seabed and foreshore issue in terms of globalised power rela-
tions and a similarly critical political economy:
This is about power and money, and the government–you’re right,
they’ve always taken from Maori – has also sponged off Maori and
then flogged it to foreigners.
This exchange therefore demonstrates the possibility of alliances and shared
interests between Maori and Pakeha – further illustrating the inadequacy of a
reductive dichotomy which structures much of the discussion, and also per-
haps the limits of the programme’s antipathy to the formal world of politics,
for the Other (s) in this instance (i.e. Crown representatives) are not present
in studio to respond.
Conclusion
This analysis has given a general overview, complemented by some illustra-
tive examples, of how the State of the Nation discussion was structured and
regulated. It is not a detailed analysis of all the discursively significant mo-
ments in the programme. Even so, it allows us to make some general observa-
tions about the programme as a public sphere event. We can, for instance,
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suggest that the programme itself embodies unresolved, post-Charter tensions
about the role of public service broadcasting in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The
fact that approximately 25 minutes of the promised two-hour discussion is
taken up with commercial advertising makes this plain.
From a public sphere theoretical perspective, we can observe that the
frequency of the advertising breaks and the general over-reliance on format-
ting seriously undermines the possibility of participatory deliberative dia-
logue, ultimately over-privileging the production imperative to control the
trajectory of the discussion, according to the programme’s preconceived sense
of the race relations issues. Livingstone’s (1996) question, as to whether the
audience discussion show genre contributes to or undermines the construc-
tion of the public sphere, is more complex.  The fact that the programme was
held at all can be interpreted as a positive contribution, particularly if one
defers to Livingstone’s favourable reading of the genre as a prompt for fur-
ther public discussion rather than, necessarily, a satisfactory debate form in
its own right.
Yet the structuring of so much of the programme as a binary Pakeha/
Maori discussion is, as we have sought to demonstrate, particularly problem-
atic. The effect, one acknowledged by the hosts’ conscious efforts to subvert
the binary late in the discussion is to reinforce, rather than transcend, the
established polarities of the New Zealand race relations debate. As a specifi-
cally discursive event, it is hard to disagree with one expert panelist’s retro-
spective evaluation of the programme as a ‘ding dong discussion’ (Hill Cone,
2004). The binary structuring and reductive demarcation of identities could
be benignly interpreted as an attempt to publicise what are perceived as emo-
tional and polarising ‘lifeworld’ discourses, as well as an acknowledgment of
the Treaty underpinning the construction of Aotearoa/New Zealand national
identity.  The fact that the validity of these perceptions – many of which serve
to orchestrate the discussion around some of the most trite and hackneyed
dichotomies –  is often belied by audience contributions serves to underscore
the lack of media reflexivity about its own role in the construction of race
relations discourse. Indeed, one could interrogate McNaught’s disclaimer by
suggesting that there is nothing ‘necessarily simplistic’ about the television
medium; the simplistic structuring of the discussion in this instance is the
clear outcome of conscious production team choices.
The simplicity of the format can perhaps be more sympathetically re-
garded as a concession to the need to give some structure to a discussion with
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well over 100 participants. This is another problematic aspect of the State of
the Nation discussion, though we offer no easy answer for negotiating this
trade off between participation and representativeness. However, we would
suggest that the demarcation of an expert elite from the rest of the audience
(s) contradicts the programme’s quasi-egalitarian commitment to celebrating
ordinary perspectives. The prospect of explicated dialogue would have been
better  served if there were fewer people present in the studio and if they had
instead been organised into a single audience group and not two reductive
identities, whose contributions, as happened on multiple occasions, needed
to be doubly mediated by McNaught and a designated cheerleader. In addi-
tion, while the selection of studio participants was clearly informed by some
notion of social representativeness, as illustrated by the mixture of ethnic,
gender and age-based identities present in the studio, there are obvious limits
to the programme’s claim to be representative politically, given its antipathy
to the formal professional field of politics and what it labels as ‘extremist’
positions.12
Finally, our analysis would suggest that the programme’s attempt to so
self-consciously simulate mediated citizen engagement is largely a travesty
of public sphere discourse.  In several cases, McNaught is forced to interrupt
the flow of the studio discussion to address the ‘audience at home’ as she
endeavours to empower their agency through a prescribed, multiple-choice
format: a crude instrumentalisation of public opinion diametrically opposed
to the deliberative intent of a public sphere philosophy. This, as we have
noted, brought with it particular technical problems in the case of State of the
Nation. The general trend towards technology-led audience interactivity can
also be critically evaluated for its ‘bottom line’ economic motive (texts to the
programme cost 50 cents including GST and phone calls to the programme
cost 99 cents). The main host’s request for questions from the television audi-
ence is, perhaps, more constructive, though this is also made problematic by
the reformulation of anonymously sourced questions about what ‘they’ at
home (neatly imagined as a coherent whole) have been saying. The valorisa-
tion of viewer questions also sits uneasily with the regulation of the studio
discussion, where the power to ask questions, or have questions put, is largely
the privilege of the programme hosts.
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Notes
1 Pakeha is the  Te Reo Maori word used to denote ‘non-Maori, European, Cau-
casian’ (Ryan, 1997, p. 189). Orewa is the name of the town where Brash made the
speech.
2 Interestingly, if you leave aside the hostile disposition towards the formal world
of institutional ‘politics’, this appeal to ordinary Kiwi identity has much in common
with the suppressed lifeworld identity appealed to by Brash’s Orewa speech (as is
suggested, for instance, by Woodham’s use – see main text - of the ‘ripping off of  a
‘scab’ metaphor).
Well, ever since Don Brash’s Orewa speech, they’ve had an awful lot to
say and it’s almost like a scab has been ripped off, and it appears our
race relations isn’t quite as idyllic as we once thought.
3 McNaught seems to strongly identify with her 12 years of New Zealand work
experience, so the categorisation of her as an ‘outsider’ is at least contestable. She is
currently based in the UK, however, where she was also ‘born and educated’ (BBC,
2005).
4 McNaught translates Puke Ariki as the ‘hill of chiefs’.
5 The treaty co-signed by representatives of Mäori iwi (i.e. tribes) and the British
Crown in 1840.
6 The use of block capitals indicates speaker emphasis. Italics are used to give
emphasis to those aspects of the text emphasised in our analysis.
7 Ngati Mutunga is one of several Taranaki based iwi. Ngati is the generic term
used to denote the ‘people of” different areas.
8 Tangata whenua translates as ‘local people, aborigine, native’ (Ryan, 1997, p.
274).
9 The immediate origins of the foreshore and seabed political controversy stem
from a Court of Appeal ruling in June 2003 which, in response to particular custom-
ary rights claims made by a group of  Marlborough based iwi, ruled that the ‘ Maori
Land Court has the power to decide foreshore and seabed claims’ (Thompson, 2003).
10 Whakapapa translates as ‘geneaology, cultural identity’ (Ryan, 1997, p. 355).
11 The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 ‘to deliberate and rule on al-
leged breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi’ (King, 2003, p. 487).
12 We are drawing here on Street’s (2001, p. 258) distinction between ‘social
representativeness’ and ‘political representativeness’ as criterion for evaluating the
democratic functioning of public sphere discourse.  Although neither gender or age
are the focus of this analysis, the programme managed to have a balance of 24 male
and 19 female contributors, while several members of the audience were invited to
give a ‘young person’s’ perspective on the discussion.
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